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Abstract 
 
This study stemmed from the lack of evidence and uncertainties regarding the economic and 
political effects of a strategic alliance between leading oil companies like Petrobras and Galp 
on their host economies. This paper investigates whether public and private corporations in the 
energy sector can influence the economic growth of their respective countries. A Panel data 
analysis was performed by employing quarterly data from (2006-2013). We also used Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to measure the technical efficiency (TE) effect of the 
alliance on the performance of both companies from 1999 to 2012. It was found the exploration 
and export of oil and gas do not play a significant role in output growth of the home economy 
and that exploration activities were inflationary, destabilising and inimical to growth, at least 
in the short-run. On another positive side, both companies showed increased technical 
efficiencies in the chosen time period. Petrobras enjoyed TE on average of 90% in the variables 
studied whereas Galp showed an average TE of 70%.  These results reflect the corporate 
strategies of both firms, which focussed on achieving profitable and sustained growth and 
enhancing their efficiencies in their collective and individual activities.  
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Introduction   
At the present time, oil and gas are considered as the precursor of economic growth (Shelley, 
2005). Simmering geopolitical tensions, high speculation in oil markets, sometimes inadequate 
fiscal and monetary systems, weak recover of the world economy from crises, and political and 
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social conditions in many parts of the world, have combined to create numerous challenges for 
the oil and gas industry (Mirani, 2009; El-Badri, 2012).  However, the major issue that the 
global oil and gas market faces is the uncertainty that surrounds the global economy (El-Badri, 
2012; Shelley, 2005).   
The reaction to the uncertainty in the global economy has been the revaluation of business 
priorities. A number of changes have been implemented to focus on outsourcing more services, 
decentralization, and cost-reductions programs among others (Mirani, 2009). These efforts 
resulted in more productivity and efficiency gains in the oil and gas industry and better returns 
since oil plays an important role in satisfying worldwide energy necessities. According to 
OPEC (2012), oil and gas prices have increased and will continue to rise due to inflation and 
average prices may reach $155 per barrel by 2035. Similarly, according to the International 
Energy Agency (2010) estimate, energy consumption between the periods of 2010-2035 will 
rise 54%. Nevertheless, this scenario represents an overwhelming challenge for the oil and gas 
industry since the demand for natural gas and oil is continuously growing, import dependency 
in the long term will intensify (Shelly, 2005). On this issue, Ortega (2011) recommends that 
the industry maximizes and improve the recovery of the existing reserves, increase exploration 
for new reserves. 
Studies focused on analysis of oil and gas import dependency by states recommend that 
companies must implement a collaborative style of work (Toft and Duero, 2011).  Drawing on 
it, oil companies have implemented partnerships and alliances to take advantage of their 
strengths and capabilities creating values throughout their business, and generating sustainable 
competitive advantage while minimizing risks and uncertainty (Newman and Chaharbaghi, 
1996; Ortega, 1997, Toft and Duero, 2011; James 2011;).  In this fast-moving market where 
there are numerous regional trade blocs, and integrated world economy, strategic alliances are 
the preferred choice for oil and gas companies as a response to these tendencies. Strategic 
alliances are implemented to increase quality, decrease cost, and enhance efficiency, share 
resources, technologies and risk (Ortega, 1997; Fadol and Sandhu, 2010). These alliances lead 
oil and gas companies sharing common goals, combine their efforts and eliminate wastage of 
resources (James, 2011). Study by James (2011) highlights the fact that the main benefit of an 
alliance between an International Oil Company (IOC) and a National Oil Company (NOC) is 
the potential access by the IOC to reserves which have positive impact on production and 
profitability. In addition the IOC can realise a significant reduction of political risk. On the 
other hand NOC-IOC alliances are a source of resources and technological transfer, especially 
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when an NOC that possesses large amount of resources requires expertise and the know-how 
of an IOC to develop and efficiently utilise those resources.  
This study is focused on the analysis of a strategic alliance between a National Oil company 
(NOC) and an International Oil Company (IOC). The main characteristic of National Oil 
Companies is that they act in response to goals of the nation (Nolan and Thurber, 2010) and 
are often seen as instruments of foreign policy (Losman, 2010). The function and configuration 
of an NOC can alter broadly dependent on governments and could bring political concerns 
(Victor et al, 2012), whereas International Oil Companies are highly specialized and 
competitive in their operations (Jaffe and Soligo, 2007; Nolan and Thurber, 2010). 
Notwithstanding, prior body of works indicates that NOCs and IOCs are considered forthright 
competitors and that both can create threats to their existence in an era where state control is 
increasing (Nolan and Thurber, 2010).  
The NOCs or state-controlled oil companies and IOCs are significant and influential economic 
organizations in the world (James, 2011). NOCs control the oil and gas industry (hydrocarbons) 
as they possess 73% of the world's oil reserves and 61% of the production. Their control in the 
gas sector is similar consisting of 68% of reserves and 52% of the production (Victor et al, 
2012). On the other hand ICOs only control 10% of worldwide oil and gas reserves (Jaffe and 
Soligo, 2007). Although national oil companies own the bulk of oil and gas resource bases, 
IOCs are the world's major oil and gas producers and also achieve higher returns on capital 
invested than NOCs (Jaffe and Soligo, 2007). However, a study by Victor et al, (2012) suggests 
that there are gaps in the existing literature about NOCs. They emphasize the inadequacy in 
studies which explain how NOCs behave and function, as well as the explanations of the 
different ways they perform and their business strategies. There is also a gap in the existing 
body of knowledge to clarify how NOCs interact with their host governments. In light of this, 
it is important to evaluate strategic alliances and the competitive strategies used by the oil and 
gas firms. This study attempts to develop a better understanding of the real benefits of strategic 
alliances amongst oil and gas companies which is eminently important for the evaluation and 
assessments of alliances in this industry. The aim of this study is to analyse to what extent 
strategic alliances in the oil and gas industry can influence the economy. In our study we will 
look at Petrobras SA of Brazil which is an NOC and Galp Energia of Portugal which is an IOC. 
Consequently the research aims to answer the question about the implications that would arise 
from the strategic alliance. In conclusion this study should provide a deeper knowledge of 
strategic alliances in the oil and gas industry and their effects on the wider economy.  
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Review of Literature                                                  
Oil remains the prime source of primary energy. Crude oil, gas and refined products collectively 
form the largest exclusive items of international trade, either measured by value or volume. 
The worldwide economy is highly dependent on this energy source and it remains important 
for the health of economies (Stevens, 2005; Behmiria and Manso, 2012). The oil and gas 
industry is characterised by technology intensity and huge investments and a high degree of 
rivalry. The current era is characterised by a period of challenges and complexity due to the 
high tariffs on oil prices and above average marginal costs, swings in oil prices, and supply 
uncertainty surrounding the main resources (Mirani, 2009; Victor, 2007 and IEF, 2012). The 
political economy of states that possess huge oil and gas resources causes inherent strains 
between the private sector and the role of the state over the control of the revenues produced 
by these natural resources (Basher & Sadorsky, 2006; Robinson, 2009; Matutinovic, 2009). 
Hvozdyk and Mercer-Blackman (2010) observe how hydrocarbons companies can influence 
economies and that additional variables can be considered in this respect such as company size, 
if the company had a merger, whether and when, reserves, interest rates and past investments. 
However it is necessary to include variables characterizing the host-country environment 
including the share of oil and gas revenues to total general government revenues, political 
stability and fiscal balance of the host country. The study further claims that the companies’ 
strategies and ownership structure needs to be considered2.  
Prior research indicates that there can exist a separation between state control and state 
governed NOCs (James, 2011), where the state retains a minority of the shareholder with veto 
right or substantial approval, for instance the case of Petrobras or Eni (Xun et al., 2011). It has 
also been noted that NOCs are a hard faction to define because NOCs shapes and functions can 
differ extensively if the government wants to control and benefit from their hydrocarbon sector 
(James, 2011; Nolan and Thurber, 2010). Nationally, these companies are used by their states 
as tools of economic development and fulfil important economic and social functions that 
compete for capital budgets that potentially can be designated for commercial activities like oil 
production activities and reserves replacement (Jaffe, 2007; Stevens, 2008; James, 2011;). 
Similarly, Pirog (2007) argued that NOCs may be involved in redistributing the oil wealth of 
the nation to society in general and to ensure national energy sufficiency. The redistribution 
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function here may be accomplished through employment policies; social welfare programs fuel 
subsidies and jobs programs.  
The expanding influence of state-owned companies on the global supply-demand balance 
brings up questions about the objectives, priorities and emerging policies of these 
organizations. Principally, changes in those objectives, priorities and policies will have 
considerable impacts on the future development of the hydrocarbons markets (James A. Baker 
III Institute, 2012).  
                        Source: Victor (2012) 
Fig 1: NOCs and Country Oil Reserves Per Capita in 2012. 
 
A considerable body of research has examined the close relationship between NOCs and their 
national governments and finds that many governments benefit from NOCs to achieve a vast 
number of socio-economic policy objectives including incorporating industrial development 
and income redistribution. This close relationship means that strategic and geopolitical intent 
is more important than commercial consideration as a factor for foreign investment decisions 
(Stevens, 2008; Robinson, 2009). NOCs are often regarded as a government tool thus making 
them vulnerable to political pressures. However, state-owned companies are not exposed to 
bankruptcy or risk of takeover because they are backed by governments (Nolan and Thurber, 
2010; Toft and Duero, 2011). Hults (2012) investigated the relationship between the 
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performance of NOCs and governance and argued that the weakness of state-owned companies 
lies in the fact that they do not have competitive pressures in their domestic markets. Due to 
this, NOCs have a lack of incentive to establish strong risk management capabilities that are 
necessary to survive in a competitive environment and to earn decent returns on capital 
investment (Hults, 2012; Victor et al., 2012, James, 2012). On the performance aspect, Hults 
(2012) suggests three interactions on the relationship between NOCs performances and 
governance elements. The study argues that performance of the NOC is superior if the state has 
total control over the enterprise and poor performance results if control of the state if 
fragmented. State-owned enterprise performs better when the state has law-based mechanisms 
to administrate them and poorly performs when the state depends on informal mechanism of 
control. Finally, NOC performance is positively associated with monitoring-heavy oversight 
system and negatively related to procedure-heavy system.  
 
Unlike state-owned companies, where the responsibilities and motivations depend on state 
goals, IOCs are market-driven and profit maximization oriented and a truly internationally 
focused. To achieve the profit maximization objectives, IOCs must compete with other oil 
companies worldwide, and to gain the opportunity to invest in development or exploration, an 
enterprise needs to guarantee value to the host country. The distinction of IOCs is that each 
company is highly specialized in what it does. Progressively, IOCs have become general 
contractors and coordinate operations of different suppliers which undertake seismic work, 
provide drilling rigs and crews, analyse data and host oil field services.  Nevertheless, despite 
the high revenues and the rise in oil prices, the majority of IOCs in recent years have not been 
able to replace their oil reserves (Jaffe and Soligo, 2007; Robinson, 2009).   
It has been noted that the relationship between NOCs and IOCs have gradually changed in the 
last twenty years as NOCs have increased their activities to expand influence on controlling 
their countries' natural resources and the selection of which IOC should have access to the 
reserves. In turn, IOCs have had to re-evaluate their strategies in other to meet NOC's current 
requirements (Ledesma, 2009; Loung and Weinthal, 2010). In these volatile markets, the 
alliances between NOCs and IOCs are becoming a tool to minimize conflicts between partners. 
Firms in the oil and gas sector recognize that alliances are the only way to minimize risk 
associated with market and technology uncertainty (IEF, 2012). The main motivations of the 
alliances between NOCs – IOCs appear to be access to resources, exploitation of local 
resources, competitive advantages, scale economy advantages, reduction of risks, technology 
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complementarities and overcoming access barriers (Murani, 2009). Nevertheless, the evolving 
business environment of the oil and gas industry has changed and consequently the main 
motivations of NOCs and IOCs to form alliances have also changed. The traditional areas of 
competence, the roles and spheres of influence of NOCs and IOCs are in constant change since 
they aim to create sustainable business models competent in withstanding worldwide economic 
challenges and myriad associated uncertainties (IEF, 2012).  
According to recent studies, NOCs and IOCs have been focused lately in examining and finding 
new strategies for the development of (liquefied natural gas) LNG3 projects (Ledesma, 2009; 
Loung and Weinthal, 2010). The traditional model argued that IOCs entirely manage the LNG 
chain, mostly using their own resources but always with the support of an NOC that is the 
natural resource-holder (Ledesma, 2009). This study argues that, nevertheless, this trend has 
changed over the years where lately NOCs have gained expertise in the area and have been 
more involved in operations and development of LNG projects. However, due to the 
relationship between NOCs and governments, and the risks associated with these projects some 
governments may not take this risk and therefore political rationale has slowed this process 
(Loung and Weinthal, 2010).  
In the energy market there is an increasing demand for natural gas, which is playing an 
important part in the evolution of the business environment. NOC-IOC alliances based on 
natural gas exploitations are expected to grow and are favoured by the discovery of substantial 
shale gas deposits around the world (Loung and Weinthal, 2010). This new discovery brings 
has a significant impact on the global gas industry which could represent new possibilities for 
NOCs and IOCs to create long-term sustainable alliances by sharing financial and operational 
risk particularly in difficult environments and in very large scale projects (James, 2012; Mirani, 
2012). In the same line of thoughts, Hults (2012) suggested that cross-accessing resources, 
technology, markets and capitals offer mutual opportunities for cooperation when firms form 
alliances for investment throughout the value chain based on horizontal and vertical integration. 
The study also mused that mutual trust and respect may serve to strength long-term alliances 
between NOCs and IOCs and when a NOCs form alliances outside their home country they 
generate added value for their shareholders.  
                                                          
3 LNG is natural gas cooled to (-162 -260 degrees Fahrenheit) that shrinks the volume of the gas 600 times. 
Liquefied natural gas value chain is composed of four elements: Upstream: Searching, exploration and 
production of gas; Liquefaction: Process in which the gas is cooled to a minimum of 160 degrees, turning into 
liquid; Shipping: the process of LNG shipping; Regasification: process through which LNG is transformed to 
gas by the addition of heat. 
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The advantages of strategic alliances in the oil and gas industry are different for NOCs and 
IOCs (Mirani, 2012; James, 2012). The reason for this is that although operationally and 
technically these firms are part of the same market and industry, they do face different problems 
and concerns4  (Ledesma, 2009). NOCs form alliances with IOCs when they need to expand 
and venture into international markets due to the vertical integration of IOCs which makes it 
easier to access the different portions of the global market. NOCs that would like to operate in 
a global market can obtain benefits from such alliances since IOCs have an enhanced 
familiarity with and a higher standing in those markets (Mirani, 2009). However, strategic 
alliances can be an unpopular decision for some governments mainly when the alliance implies 
investment in technology with significant environmental footprint or investment in states with 
dubious governance reputations (Zanoyan, 2002). Another challenge in strategic alliance 
occurs when the host nation depends on the alliance rather than on unmitigated competition for 
individual tenders (Hults, 20012; Victor et, al., 2012). Consequently, the state can lose the 
competitiveness that allows it to get a favourable total return (De Olveira, 2012).  
Access to oil and gas reserves in the actual competitive market is the main concern of IOCs. It 
has been argued that the main reason for alliances is to facilitate international oil companies’ 
access to reserves (Mirani, 2009; Hults, 2012). Zanoyan (2002) characterised this relationship 
as positive for both since the place where IOCs look for potential access benefits from the 
resources and technology of the IOCs. In addition, IOCs could face a decline in political risk 
by being in an alliance where the action by the host government against foreign firms might be 
less likely to occur. Well-structured alliances could lead to increase of investment levels in the 
hydrocarbon industry as a whole precisely if the returns and risks from these alliances are 
appropriately distributed (Nolan and Turber, 2012). Nowadays, NOCs own the majority of 
global oil and gas reserves, and as a result IOCs realize that their future activities only can 
increase if they take part in alliances in which control, risks and profits are shared. In turn, 
states of origin of NOCs need to ensure strong governance and more transparent and stable 
investment environment (Hults, 2012).  
 
                                                          
4  NOCs concerns: Access to markets, capitals, technology, management of IOC presence, managing risk, 
organizational politics, local policies and government bureaucracy. IOCs concerns: profitability, access to 
opportunities, risk management, share price, commercial competition, investor relations, and legal and regulatory 
issues.  
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Nolan and Turber (2010) assert that risk and uncertainty are plentiful in the oil and gas industry. 
The study argues that the magnitudes of the investment risks for the oil and gas industry can 
vary depending on the capital investments (Nolan and Turber, 2010). There is also exploration 
risk due to geological uncertainty despite the modest capital exposure involved (Hults, 2012; 
Ernst and Steinhubl, 1997). In contrast, field development is a high risk venture even though 
there is no uncertainty. However, when a field is discovered it is necessary to invest a great 
deal of capital to develop it. Studies by Hults (2012) and Victor (2007) argued that the levels 
of risks are a function of the magnitudes of the production and exploration programmes. The 
risks and uncertainty decrease as experience and knowledge acquired over time increase and 
as unused oil and gas reserves are proven commercially and eventually become mature. The 
uncertainties that alliances in the oil and gas industry face are not only geological but, are also 
related to the future conditions of the market (Nolan and Turber, 2010; Hults, 2012). Another 
risk faced by alliances in this industry is related to natural gas developments which require 
expensive infrastructure investment throughout the value chain, and this risk is more noticeable 
in cross-border projects. Alliances face supply risk in downstream investments which are in 
almost all cases uncertain since for instance, refinery will require inputs of oil and gas to run 
at capacity over long period of time in order to recover cost (Nolan and Turber, 2010). Hence, 
the relationship between National Energy Companies and International Energy Companies has 
gradually changed in the last thirty years with an increase in the number of players in the 
industry. The new players in the field seek to have access to reserves and to obtain strategic 
and early positions in potential LNG projects. The behaviour of IOCs has gradually changed 
in the oil and gas industry offering NOCs part of the chain that previously they had been 
unwilling to provide. IOCs have to evolve to respond to the new opportunities since NOCs 
seek new partners to develop alliances to add value to their operations.  
 
 
 
 
Overview of Petrobras SA: Strategy and Performance  
Petrobras SA is one of the most successful national Oil and Gas Companies in the world, and 
stands out as particularly successful in the production and exploration of deep-water oil with a 
dominant position in the Brazilian oil and gas sector and a growing presence internationally 
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(De Oliveira, 2012). This Brazilian state-owned company has on several occasions used its 
political connections, along with its offshore technological capabilities to create partnerships 
with IOCs. Usually the company explored overseas opportunities in countries with connection 
to the Brazilian state, mainly in South America where Petrobras serve as an instrument of 
political integration (Bell, 2011). From the mid-1990s, the Brazilian government implemented 
a strategy of competition as a way to encourage investment in the country’s oil reserves. In 
2008 this strategic ambition showed result when the company reached self-sufficiency in oil 
and became a net exporter. Today, oil imports are no longer a macroeconomic concern for the 
government. The Brazilian government turned the attention to oil revenues as a future source 
of government revenue. According to Adelman (2003) the Petrobras’s success is due to the 
company’s continuous strategic orientation to the minimization of risks that are a critical aspect 
of the oil industry.  
When the imports of the company started to rise, Petrobras’s risk management strategy changed 
to a more commercial one. To deal with these commercial risks, the company developed 
logistics refineries, which was a huge investment for the company but not a risky investment 
due to the company’s monopoly position. With this it was possible to increase the output as 
upstream operations found and produced more oil. To minimize technological risk in these 
operations, the company relied heavily on technological partnerships with other companies 
while building its in-house capabilities (Bell, 2011). In 1974, the company faced the necessity 
of cooperation with IOCs to speed up the development of new identified fields that hold sizable 
oil reserves because the company had little capacity of its own to operate offshore (Petrobras, 
2013). The Brazilian government provided Petrobras with a large set of regulatory and 
economic incentives to achieve its main goals. The autonomy and legal oil monopoly granted 
to Petrobras have allowed the company to develop a vertically integrated renowned oil 
company. The monopoly power enhances the company’s capacity to invest, moving along the 
technological learning curve and enjoying economies of scale. With the purpose of becoming 
an international energy company, Petrobras has increased its investments to protect its 
competitive position overseas and in the domestic market. The company has declared its 
intention to develop new projects in the power sector to utilize gas reserves in the country as 
well as in renewable energy and petrochemical businesses (De Oliveira, 2012).  
 
Overview of Galp Energia: Strategy and Performance  
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Galp Energia has an integrated energy operation and has a presence throughout the value chain 
of oil and natural gas, and increasingly active in renewable energy. It is a leader in the energy 
sector in Portugal (oil and natural gas). The company owns Petrogal (the only refining company 
and leading distributor of oil products in Portugal) and GDP Gás (the company responsible for 
the transportation, distribution and importation of natural gas in Portugal). It also has a strong 
presence worldwide operating in countries like Spain, Angola, Venezuela, Brazil, 
Mozambique, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Timor-Lester (Galp, 2013).  
The company’s structure is divided into three main parts: Production and Exploration, Refining 
and Marketing and Gas and Power Sectors. The corporate strategy of Galp has developed a 
new aspect known as Tri-Fuel – oil, gas and electricity. The new strategy considered 
strengthening of the exploration and production of oil, investment in refining, the entry in the 
electricity sector and the growth into natural gas (Barreto, 2012). The company and its 
subsidiaries have worldwide activities, with over 40 projects across the world. In the Refining 
and Marketing sector, the company has its activities of refining oil and gas and producing final 
goods for their consumers including gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and others. The Gas and Power 
sector is focused on the supply and distribution of natural Gas in Portugal, as well as in Spain. 
The company also produces electricity and thermal energy (Santos, 2012).Galp Energia has 
been profitable from its three segments of Gas and Power, Exploration and Production and 
Refining and Marketing businesses. Galp Energia has a goal to increase production and 
exploration and the company achieved in 2010 to produce 150 thousand barrels of oil per day 
(Santos, 2012).  
Galp aims to develop potential multi-energy strategies bounded by environmental, economic 
and social restrictions with the purpose to grow existing activities and look for investment in 
new opportunities. This measure is intended to improve the efficiency and profitability of their 
assets, increasing the ability to compete in markets where it operates, and intensify efforts for 
innovation, quality and safety (Galp, 2011). In the exploration and production sector, Galp has 
a goal of achieving a production level 10 times higher than the volume of production in 2008 
and equal to half of its refining capacity. In refining and distribution the company plans to 
generate more value from its assets, especially refineries and distribution network of oil 
products (Galp, 2012).  In short, Galp Energia attempts to integrate the business of gas supply 
capacity of natural gas, developing the water sector and its range of wind farms and eventually 
become a prominent company in the markets where it opreates (Barreto, 2012). 
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Methodology & Data  
We use a combination of cross-sectional and time series data from 2006 to 2013. The frequency 
of the data is quarterly obtained from Compustat database. It is not possible to use a longer 
time series because the Petrobras - Galp alliance on started in 2006. The variables chosen are 
for the examination of the effectiveness of the strategic alliance between the state-owned 
company and the private company. To analyse the effect of this alliance on the national and 
economic policies of Brazil and Portugal from 2006 to the present we use national GDP growth 
as a measure of national effect. To able to investigate this effect we include measures of 
constraints and strengths in this alliance proxied by Oil Refining, Oil Exploration and Revenues 
and Reserves of each company. On the other hand we also include the exports of each country 
as a regressor. This quarterly data starts from the first quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 
2013. We fit a balanced panel data for the two countries and companies to the equation 
explained below.  
 
Panel Data Model  
A panel data analysis is known to improve econometric analysis in a number of ways including 
increasing the number of data points therefore improving the efficiency of the regression 
estimates (Hsiao, 2003). It also allows for the analysis of more research questions relative time-
series and or cross-section data alone. In our case with only two countries (companies) and 30 
quarters, a longitudinal data analysis increases our data points significantly to 60.   
The standard multiple regression models shows how each of the explanatory variables predicts 
GDP growth (the response variable). Hence, the growth of GDP will also represent the 
influence upon the two economies of Brazil and Portugal of the strategic alliance. We first 
considered the variables of both companies – Petrobras and Galp- for the regression model, 
presented in panel data as Oil Refining, Oil Exploration, Revenues of the companies, proven 
reserves of the companies and exports. The empirical model looks as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 
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                                         +𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 +  𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                   (1) 
 
Where 𝛽0 is the constant term,  GDP is growth in gross domestic product, 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  is 
refining capacity, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is expenditures on exploration for oil and gas, 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 is 
revenue received by each company, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 is total proven oil and gas reserves for each 
company, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 are the export volumes of oil and gas for each country, 𝛽𝑖𝑡′𝑠 are coefficients 
on the independent variables and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the overall error term. 
 
Empirical Analysis and Discussion of Results  
We fit the longitudinal data to the equation above and estimate it by OLS in STATA. We use 
robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedastcity and the regression results are presented 
below in the table below: we run three regressions with refining and exploration in all the 
regressions with alternately revenue, reserves and export separately in the three regressions 
because of high correlation between the last three variables. All the variables are in natural 
logarithms. 
 
In all three regressions the R-squares are reasonable and the F-statistics support the notion that 
the coefficients are not all zeros. In regression1, exploration is weakly significant and refining 
is significant at the 1% level and has a positive sign suggesting that the refining activities of 
the two companies contribute positively to the growth of the respective countries national 
income. In all three regressions the coefficient on exploration is robust and stable but negative. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Effects of Petrobras-Galp strategic alliance on GDP growth of Brazil and Portugal 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP growth   
 regression 1 regression 2 regression 3 
DependentVariables    
Exploration -0.229       -0.287 -0.203 
 (-1.660)* (-2.480)*** (-1.700)* 
Oil Reserves 0.091       -0.054 0.067 
 (1.040)      (-0.650) (0.620) 
Oil Refining 0.344***   
 (2.260)   
Revenues  0.294***  
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         (3.580)  
Exports of oil   0.215 
   (1.460) 
Constant term -1.366 0.495 0.429 
 (-2.900) (0.810) (0.470) 
R-squared 0.187 0.265 0.174 
N 60 60 60 
t-values are in parentheses and are based on heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. *** shows 
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10% level. 
 
The negative sign for exploration although unexpected but may suggest that exploration 
expenditures initially are a leakage to the economies and subtract rather than add to growth in 
the short term. There might be another explanation that the coefficient might be capturing the 
negative effects between oil prices which are volatile and GDP which is extensively accepted 
in the literature, the so called “Oil-GDP relationship” (Awerbuch and Sauter, 2005). According 
to Yang et al., (2002), the exploration of oil and gas is dependent upon the oil prices and it is 
likely that exploration of oil has negative effects on GDP growth, which is supported by our 
findings. The negative relation between oil exploration and growth finding has also been 
supported by Hamilton’s (1983) work suggesting that exploration is affected by the oil prices 
and consequently the increase of exploration reduces GDP growth output. Hamilton found that 
between 1948 -1980, the growth in oil exploration in the US was accompanied by output 
decrease. It is likely that the increase in exploration associated with oil price increases reduce 
GDP growth due to rise in production cost. Additionally, large explorations and higher oil price 
changes may affect aggregate output growth due to the delay in business investments that 
increase uncertainty. When companies such as Petrobras and Galp face these higher costs and 
increase prices for their outputs, this leads to increase in inflation and consequently negatively 
affecting the GDP growth of Brazil and Portugal. 
In regression 2, exploration is strongly significant this time but the coefficient is not 
significantly different than in regression 1. Revenue is very significant and positive as expected 
signifying the positive contribution of increased revenues for the two companies to growth of 
national income. This is consistent with neoclassical growth theory where oil revenues may 
affect growth positively through increased investment spending, and empirically this result is 
borne out by numerous findings including Segal and Sen (2011) and Dreger & Rahmani (2014). 
The R-squared here is slightly higher than in the other two regressions. Refining which is a 
very capital intensive business also contributes positively to growth through capital investment 
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and value added. This is also consistent with empirical evidence for example Cross, et 
al.,(2013). 
In regression 3 only exploration is slightly significant and oil export is positive but not 
significant. The significance of this result is that oil export did not contribute significantly to 
the growth of the economies of the two countries. It has however, been largely accepted in the 
literature that export contributes to economic growth directly. However, our regression result 
suggests that oil exports from 2006 to 2013 have not significantly contributed to growth for 
both Brazil and Portugal during this period. The result therefore suggests that Brazilian and 
Portuguese GDPs have not achieved significant benefit from the opportunities generated by the 
increase in oil exports. It is likely that the Brazilian and Portuguese economic growth generated 
by Petrobras and Galp is independent of the expansion of oil exports and oil price increases. 
The fact that the Brazilian and Portuguese GDPs did not benefit from opportunities generated 
by Petrobras and Galp through the increases in oil exports may not be that surprising, but 
plausible as the growth rates of all the sectors in Brazil and Portugal were much lower during 
this period of rising oil prices than during the period of recession.  
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)  
Based on the initial idea of Farrell (1975), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or frontier 
analysis was applied to evaluate the technical efficiency (TE) of various comparable entities, 
designed by DMUs (Decision Making Units). The DEA evaluates by linear programing 
techniques and the measure of efficiency is based on the difference between the observed units 
and best practices (SCRS, 1997). The performance measure tools as DEA can provides 
guidance to companies to evaluate the allocation of their main competitive advantage and 
resources in other to determine the way that competitive advantages and resources may be 
administered and assigned to value-adding activities. Consequently DEA can help companies 
to identify fields where resources can be misallocated. This study demonstrates the DEA 
approach as a non-parametric technique for measuring the technical efficiency of oil and gas 
companies in our study. Besides, this approach can provide a measure of the performance of 
each company.  
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This study analyses separately the technical efficiency for both companies5. To measure the 
technical efficiency of these companies, we use following steps.  
For this study two output measures, refining capacity and employment and two inputs 
measures, export and production were used and incorporated into the DEA model to represent 
the input/output data for both companies from 1999 to 2012. 
Model selection: the efficiency was computed by the following equation: 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 
 
Model development: fourteen years/models for each company, used to evaluate the 
corresponding efficiency score for each DMU during 1999 to 2012.  
We used Excel package to perform the calculation for Petrobras and Galp from 1999 to 2006. 
To compare both companies Petrobras and Galp and measure their performances, the 
commonly used method of ratios was utilized. We first took an output measure which was 
divided by an input measure. More precisely as follows:  
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
   ;    
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
  ;  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
The next equation followed was the sum of the outputs and inputs for each of the equations:  
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 
 
Then the results were transformed to % and with this the technical efficiency for each of the 
three equations was obtained. The results show that the major technical efficiency for 
export/capacity obtained for Galp was in 2006 with (100 %) of efficiency. This result can be 
justified first, as a continuation of the good result obtained in 2005 (TE = 91,8%), representing 
an increase of 10%. Second the high levels of net profit achieved by the company (755 million 
euros). This net profit excluded gains from the sales of the regasification of natural gas to the 
National Grid and of transport assets (Galp Sustainability Report, 2005/2006). Beside this, it 
is important to recognize that in 2006, Galp and Petrobras signed their strategic alliance. 
Regarding the TE for export and employment the more significant values were obtained from 
                                                          
5    Ajalli et al. (2010), Oliveira et al. (2007) and Ines and Martinez (2011) used case study approach to measure 
the technical efficiency in the energy industry. 
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2009 to 2012 (87, 98%, 95,70%, 98,30% and 93,77% respectively) where the company reached 
a TE of more than 95%, this was in 2011 when the RCA6 net profit for Galp was € 306 million 
(43% more than in 2009). This huge revenue was due to the improvement in the performances 
in the different business segments of Gas and Power, Refining and Marketing (Galp, 2011). In 
relation to Production and Employment the most significant efficiency value was achieved by 
the company in 2007 with a TE of 87, 72% this was due the discovery of new oil wells in Bacia 
De Santos – Brazil. This new discoveries transformed the profile of Galp and the Brazilian 
government authorized the company to increase the production in oil wells discovered 
previously and there was also new oil wells discovery in Angola. Galp also signed a contract 
with Eni for the exploration of five oil wells in Timor-Leste and Mozambique. Moreover, the 
company also signed an agreement with the Portuguese Government for the exploration of oil 
and gas in the Portuguese cost. 
As mentioned earlier, the technical efficiency was calculated for Petrobras as well. In 2009 the 
company reached they major TE for Export and Capacity – 100 %, and additionally Petrobras 
achieved the largest revenues since the beginning of its operations and the biggest result of a 
publicly traded company in Brazil. According to IBGE (2010) 7 , this result reflected the 
expansion of the Brazilian economy in 2010 that achieved a growth rate of 7.5%. Petrobras 
increased its exports and there was a recovery in the international oil and gas prices (BP, 2012). 
In 2010, there was increase in the nominal capacity utilization of the refinery – 93% (Petrobras, 
2010). The results for the technical efficiency in Exports and Capacity for Petrobras between 
1999 to 2012 period was very good. These results are likely to have been influenced by the 
greater number of oil wells exploitation without any restrictions made by the Brazilian 
government (Petrobras, 2011). 
In relation to the technical efficiency for export and employment applied to the DEA model, 
the company achieved their higher efficiency in 2001 – 100%. According to a study by the 
Brazilian Centre for Infrastructure, the total number of employees of Petrobras grew at a rate 
higher than the production of oil and gas between 1998 and 2011 (Folha de Sao Paulo, 2012). 
The above finding can justify the higher values of TE for Export and Employment in this time 
period analyzed for this particular case study. It is important to highlight that the TE for this 
measure were always up to 89 %. Between 2000 and 2011 Petrobras recorded a growth of 
                                                          
6 RCA: Replacement Cost Adjusted – Accounting practice for reporting profits in the oil industry. 
7 IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – Brasilian Institute of Geography and Statitisc  
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reserves and production of Oil and Gas above the world average. The oil production of Brazil 
grew 73%, compared to the 12% of global growth. In relation to the production of natural gas, 
there was an increase of 61% in Brazil in comparison to the 36% rate of worldwide growth. 
The oil reserves for Brazil grew 73% in this period in contrast with the 38% of the global oil 
reserves growth (Fatos E Dados – Petrobras, 2013).  
With results of the Data Envelopment Analysis approach using the data of the Brazilian NOC 
and the Portuguese IOC, some inferences are emphasized here. For the Brazilian national 
company the achievement of their macroeconomic performance goals is of high priority 
shouldering the social responsibilities that the company has with the Brazilian government. 
From these results it can be argued that Petrobras possess capabilities to perform and undertake 
political and social tasks and objectives. It is worth highlighting that the Brazilian government 
has influence when the company is formulating their corporate strategy as well as their other 
economic goals. 
In relation to the private Portuguese company, the results of the DEA approach demonstrated 
that the strategy of Galp’s was designed to take advantage of the current and future dynamics 
of the Oil and Gas industry, which include the expected sustained increase in demands for oil 
and natural gas worldwide. With the results obtained, it can be argued that the primary objective 
of the company is to create a sustainable value for its shareholders, especially through 
exploration and production, and in particular exploration activities. This strategy reflects a 
focus on obtaining a profitable sustained growth for production, which is likely to be supported 
by the cash flow generated by the worldwide business.  
Based on the results obtained from our analysis, both companies were highly efficient from 
1999 to 2012 period in exporting and capacity with an average result of 90.5%.  Exporting and 
employment achieve 89.28% of technical efficiency in the same period time. Regarding 
production and employment both companies achieved as well a good technical efficiency of 
84.03%.  These results might be related with the strategies of both companies as taking 
advantage of their competitiveness, creating value through the exploration of oil and gas wells 
and developing world-class resilient and profitable businesses.  
Conclusions  
We can conclude that the exploration of oil consistently had negative effects on the GDP growth 
of Brazil and Portugal. This is because exploration is positively related to rising and variable 
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oil and gas prices which are inflationary and destabilizing and affect investment and therefore 
growth adversely. This negative impact is consistent with theory and supported by previous 
empirical evidence. Exports of oil were not found to be significant for the GDP growth. 
Refining and company revenue increases are found to promote growth of GDP. This is 
consistent with neoclassical growth theory where oil revenues can affect growth positively 
through increased investment spending. This result is also borne out by numerous empirical 
findings including Segal and Sen, 2011; Dreger & Rahmani, 2014). 
Contribution to the existing body of knowledge was achieved by using a specific case study 
and from the results it was clear to see how the alliances contributed to enhancing the efficiency 
of both companies. However, it was not evident how these companies can contribute positively 
for the host countrys’ income growth directly as an alliance, since the results obtained for GDP 
growth were negative. 
On the basis of empirical results presented and discussed earlier, we can conclude that the 
companies showed an established and sustainable growth. Petrobras and Galp achieved good 
levels of technical efficiency on exports, capacity, employment and production. It was 
identified that Petrobras achieved excellent result in technical efficiency in more than segment 
analyse, it is also concluded that their results in level of technical efficiency related with 
employment are constantly high. It is evident from the analysis that Galp obtained major 
technical efficiency in exports and capacity. Since 2006, when the strategic alliance was began 
those values have progressively increased.  
A limitation of this study which we can acknowledge is that the focus on a particular case of 
only two firms. There will be numerous factors that would have an impact on strategic alliances 
for instance the type of business model adopted, organisational characteristics, dimensions of 
infrastructures and Geographic variables, which however we have not addressed and leave it 
for future research.  
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